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Abstract—This paper presents an easy to design Physically Un-
clonable Function (PUF). The proposed PUF implementation is a
loop composed of N identical and controllable delay chains which
are serially assembled in a loop to create a single ring oscillator.
The frequency discrepancies resulting from the oscillator driven
by complementary combinations of the delay chains allows to
characterize one device. The presented PUF, nicknamed the Loop
PUF (LPUF), returns a frequency comparison of loops made of
N delay chains (N ≥ 2). The comparisons are done sequentially
on the same structure. Unlike others PUFs based on delays, there
is no specific routing constraints. Hence the LPUF is particularly
flexible and easy to design. The basic use of the Loop PUF is
to generate intrinsic device keys for cryptographic algorithms.
It can also be used to generate challenge response pairs for
simple authentication. Experiments have been carried out on
CYCLONE II FPGAs to assess the performance of the LPUF,
such as randomness, uniqueness and steadiness. They clearly
show both the easiness of design and the quality level of the
LPUF. The measurement time vs steadiness, as well as resistance
against side-channel and modeling attacks are discussed.
Keywords: PUF, key generation, authentication, random-
ness, steadiness, uniqueness, FPGA, ASIC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The function of a PUF is to provide a signature specific
to each integrated circuit. Their invention has been motivated
to obtain both low-cost authentication methods and robust
structures against physical attacks. The PUF signature is
used either via a Challenge-Response Pair (CRP) protocol
for authentication, or to generate a private key or random
variable in a ciphering operation. It can avoid the use of digital
memory to store a key imposed by the IC manufacturer or user.
Hence they are well suited in low-cost devices as the RFIDs or
smartcards. However the responses given to the CRP protocol
could be the base of powerful attacks based on Machine
Learning (ML) algorithms to create modeling attacks [1]–
[4]. The side-channel attacks based on the observation of the
PUF activity is another potential attack. Moreover the PUFs
have to be reliable against operating conditions (temperature,
voltage, etc.) modifications which could be either natural or
malevolent in case of attacks. Consequently PUF are often
associated with protocols or structures specifically designed
to thwart the attacks or enhance the reliability. The structure
of PUFs can take advantage of special technological process
as the Optical PUF [5], [6] and the Coating PUF [6]. The
Optical PUF consists of a transparent material containing
randomly distributed scattering particles allowing to deviate
the laser light. The Coating PUF uses an opaque material
randomly doped with dielectric particles and placed on top
of the IC. The Silicon PUF is certainly the simplest PUF as
it does not require any technological modification. It takes
advantage of randomness introduced definitively during the
manufacturing process. Indeed, the dispersion between the
wires and transistors is perceptible from one circuit to another,
even if they are part of the same silicon wafer. The first silicon
PUF introduced by Gassend et al. is the Arbiter PUF [7] which
compares the delay between two identical controlled paths.
The Arbiter PUF can be derived in XOR PUF suggested in [8]
and Lightweight Secure PUF [9] which is a composition of
Arbiter PUFs. To solve problems of same delay PUFs that
it is easy to predict the relation between delay information
and generated information, the Glitch PUF is introduced by
D. Suzuki et al. in [10]
The Ring-Oscillator (RO) PUF introduced by Suh et al. [8]
is a set of ring oscillators pairs which are compared in
frequency. Guajardo et al. introduced the SRAM PUF [11]
which is linked with the state of the SRAM at power up. The
Butterfly PUF [12] works as the SRAM PUF but the memory
point is based on two flip-flops. A classification given in [11]
and [4] considers Strong PUFs and Weak PUFs according
to their number of challenges and the difficulty to read the
responses out. One special type is the Controlled PUF [13]
which adds control logic to improve the PUF robustness. The
Arbiter PUF is particularly fast but needs a design care to
balance the delays between the two paths. The RO PUF is
simple to implement as it is made of identical ring oscillator
pairs but it could be sensitive to EM attacks [14].
The proposed PUF is a single ring oscillator or a “Loop”
based on controllable delay elements. Contrary to the tra-
ditional approaches based on differential and parallel com-
parisons (Arbiter PUF, RO PUF), the Loop PUF compares
multiple elements sequentially. This offers greater flexibility
and design easiness. The greater measurement time (a few ms)
could be largely acceptable for many applications (e.g. gener-
ation of cryptographic keys). Experiments have been carried
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out on CYCLONE II FPGAs. Quality metric as randomness,
uniqueness and steadiness have been measured and discussed.
Also enhancement of steadiness and robustness against attacks
has been investigated.
The article is organized as follows: Section II presents the
principle of the Loop PUF and the operating modes to take
advantage of its structure. The Section III describes experi-
ments and results carried out on CYCLONE II FPGAs. Finally,
conclusions and perspectives are discussed in Section V.
II. PROPOSED PUF
A. Structure
The proposed PUF, the “Loop PUF” is a silicon PUF based
on N delay chains forming a loop. When closed by an inverter
this loop oscillates as a single ring oscillator. a delay chain
is composed of a series of M controlled delay elements
connected to each other. A single controlled delay element is
shown in Fig. 1. Every delay chain i receives a control word
Ci of M bits. Fig. 2 represents the structure of the LPUF with
N = 3. Each bit Cji , i ∈ [1, N ], j ∈ [1,M ], selects a delay
value of the associated j delay element in the chain i.
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Figure 1. Basic delay element in a Loop PUF.
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Figure 2. Loop PUF structure.
Compared to the RO PUF [8] the LPUF has only one
oscillator and there is no delay chain pairing (N can be greater
than 2). The noise introduced to the LPUF impacts all delay
chains and the local cross-coupling is limited as there is only
one oscillator. Compared to the Arbiter PUF illustrated in
Fig. 3 and introduced by Gassend et al. [7], the structure of
the LPUF is simpler as there is no need to cross wires in the
delay elements and extra logic to balance the two chains as
in [15].
The only design constraint imposed to build the LPUF is to
duplicate the delay chain N times with a faithful reproduction
of the placing and routing. This constraint is quite easy to meet
in ASIC. In FPGA we can be doubtful as the routing structure
is unknown and well protected by some FPGA manufacturers.
Our experiments conducted in Sec. III show that it is easy to
C
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Figure 3. Arbiter PUF structure.
duplicate small structures such as delay chains in ALTERA
FPGAs. Moreover Fig. 2 shows that the delay chain has no
internal Place and Route constraints. The only requirement is
a perfect N times duplication of the reference delay chain.
The LPUF controller is in charge of extracting the result, that
is either an intrinsic key or the response of a CRP challenge.
To do so it has to drive the LPUF loop by a set of N control
words Ci, and measure the corresponding frequency or period.
B. LPUF control
1) Principle: The controller measures and compares the
loop oscillation frequency for different combinations of control
words Ci associated to each of the N delay chains. A fixed
timing window of the LPUF signal is used as a reference for
the measurement. Then, the number of system clock periods
are counted during this measurement window. This number
is used as a result as it is directly correlated to the LPUF
frequency. For a given set of control words, called “Challenge”
C1, ..., CN , the controller applies different combinations of the
control words and measures the frequency f or the delay d of
the oscillating loop. The result should remain the same for all
permutations of Ci if the delay chains are perfectly balanced.
But in physical devices there is a slight frequency discrepancy
because of CMOS variability is be exploited to build silicon
PUFs. As an example we can consider N = 2 and the delay
element j illustrated in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4. Delay element j for two delay chains.
If an oscillation period measurement is done with the
combination Cj1 = 0 and C
j
2 = 1, then with C
j
1 = 1 and
Cj2 = 0, the difference of the two measured delays is:
Dj = (dj1,0 + d
j
2,1)− (dj1,1 + dj2,0).
Dj should be ideally equal to zero, but this is never the
case because of the process dispersion.
Hence for N = 2, if we consider the control words C1 and
C2, the PUF identity ID can be expressed by:
ID = sign(DC1C2 −DC2C1).
= sign

 M∑
j=1
(dj
1,Cj1
+ dj
2,Cj2
)− (dj
1,Cj2
+ dj
2,Cj1
)

 .
If the frequency is measured instead of the time, the same
equations apply by using the frequency difference rather than
the delay difference.
2) Control strategy with N > 2: The controller generates
automatically the combination of control words from the initial
challenge, in order to perform pairwise comparisons, as for
N = 2. For instance, the controller rotates N times the control
words in order to get N identity bits.
This is illustrated in Fig. 5 with N=3. The challenge inputs
the LPUF with three control words C1C2C3, say ABZ. Then
the LPUF controller makes 3 rotations of ABZ and measures
the delay for each. The LPUF returns an ID code of at least
3 bits corresponding to the code of 3! possible orders.
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LPUF controller
freq
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ID0 = sign(DABZ −DBZA)
ID2 = sign(DZAB −DABZ)
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Figure 5. LPUF control example with N = 3.
In this case the 3 bits of the LPUF identity are expressed
by:
ID0 = sign
(
DABZ − DBZA
)
(1)
= sign
(∑M
j=1(d
j
1,Aj
+ d
j
2,Bj
+ d
j
3,Zj
) − (d
j
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j
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j
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)
)
.
ID1 = sign
(
DBZA − DZAB
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ID2 = sign
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3) Choice of control words: In equation (1), we can see
that the control words, AjBjZj , determine the number of
delays which contribute to the IDs. For instance if Aj = Bj 6=
Zj , the two delays dj2 and d
j
3 are used to calculate ID0. The
reliability is enhanced if more delays are used as the variance
of the resulting distribution increases proportionally to the
number of delays. This property is studied in subsection III-C1
about the steadiness indicator. The difference between each
control word is expressed by the Hamming distance H:
H =
N∑
i=1
N∑
i′>i
HW (Ci ⊕ Ci′) , (2)
where HW is the Hamming Weight function of Ci XOR Ci′ .
As H should be maximum, it can be shown that for M = 1
(words of one bit), the H maximum Hmax is given by this
formula:
N odd ⇒ Hmax = (N
2
−1)
4 . (3)
N even ⇒ Hmax = N24 .
In addition to the requirement of having H maximum,
there is another constraint which is to avoid equivalent control
words. For instance if N = 2 and M = 3, the ID obtained
from the challenge (0, 1) is the same as (2, 3), (4, 5) and (6, 7).
Eq. 4 with N = 2 and M = 2 shows that the challenge (0, 1)
is equivalent to (2, 3).
D(00,01) −D(01,00)
= ((d11,0 + d
1
2,0)− (d
1
1,0 + d
1
2,0)) + ((d
2
1,0 + d
2
2,1)− (d
2
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2
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2
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2
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2
2,0))
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1
2,1)− (d
1
1,1 + d
1
2,1)) + ((d
2
1,0 + d
2
2,1)− (d
2
1,1 + d
2
2,0))
= D(10,11) −D(11,10)
The constraint to avoid equivalent challenges can be for-
malized by this equation:
∀j ∈ [1,M ]
N∏
i=1
Cji = 0.
Even with this constraint the number of possible challenges
is much greater with regards to the Arbiter PUF. The number
of challenges for an Arbiter PUF having M elements is 2M ,
whereas the LPUF has a total of 2NM challenges minus the
combination which does not meet the condition expressed
in Eq. 4. Tab.I shows the maximum number of possible
challenges for N = 2, N = 3 and for different values of
M .
A minimum number of challenges have to be chosen to
generate an ID with nbbits number of bits. For instance to
obtain an ID of 64-bit with N = 3 and rotations on control
words as shown in figure 5, the number of challenges is:⌈
64
log2 3!
⌉
= 26 challenges.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND LPUF EVALUATION
Experiments have been carried out to check the easiness
of design in FPGA, its complexity, reliability and quality
indicators. The targeted FPGAs are ALTERA CYCLONE II
running on DE2 boards.
A. Design easiness, complexity and measurement time
First the feasibility to duplicate the same delay chain N
times in ALTERA is investigated. In this technology the
Copy/Paste operation of the placed/routed blocks is not so
obvious than in ASIC or XILINX FPGAs. The placement
of the LPUF delay chains is constrained by using “Logi-
cLocks” and node locations declaration. If the delay chain
does not exceed the height of one row, the routing per-
formed by the Quartus CAD tool remains the same on all
the delay chains. This is corroborated by both the routing
result and the delay values. The routing result is given in
the file <project.rcf> if the command quartus_cdb
<project> --back_annotate=routing has been set
first.
Fig. 6 illustrates the placement of the LPUF with N = 3
chains and M = 8 delay elements. Every delay element uses
two logic cells, one of which is a multiplexer driven by the
control bit of the delay element. The right side of Fig. 6 shows
Table I
NUMBER OF CHALLENGES.
M
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 12 16
Charbiter 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 1024 4096 65536
ChLPUF
N = 2 4 13 40 121 364 1093 3280 29524 ∼250K ∼21M
N = 3 4 44 360 2680 19244 ∼130K ∼1M ∼45M ∼2G ∼5000G
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Figure 6. Placement of 3 delay chains in the loop.
4 delay elements. The 8 elements of a chain are placed in the
same cluster of cells (called Logic Array Block for ALTERA).
The LPUF complexity in CYCLONE II with these param-
eters: N = 3, M = 7, H = 9, is of 49 cells for the loop itself
and 349 for the LPUF controller.
The measurement time depends on the number of ID bits,
and thus the number of challenges as given by equation 4.
Another important factor is the reliability of the measurement.
The PUF ID is more reliable if the measurement time is
increased. For instance to obtain 16 reliable bits, 20 ms are
required for an error probability of 10−4 with a single parity
bit. A more robust Error Correcting Code (ECC) could be used
to reduced either the measurement time or the error probability.
This point is discussed in Sec. IV-A.
B. Inter-Chip Study
This experience is to check the distributions of delays and
the uniqueness of IDs between L PUFs placed on different
devices. It has been performed on L = 24 FPGAs with
the LPUF parameters N = 2, M = 15, each delay chain
being placed in the same row and in two adjacent columns.
In this experiment the frequency of oscillations is measured
by counting the number of oscillations in a time window of
fixes size. The ID depends on the frequency difference F j
when the challenge {C1, C2} = {0, 2j} is applied, where
j is the delay element index. 16 delay elements makes up
the delay chain but this 16th element is not considered as
it cannot be balanced. This comes from the different routing
between the two delay chains, as shown in Fig. 2 for the Nth
delay chain. 15 challenges are provided to the LPUF, from
{C1, C2} = {0, 21} to {0, 215}. Hence each LPUF produces
a 15-bit ID which is compared with the other LPUF IDs by
using the Hamming Distance (HD). From the 276 (24×23/2)
pairwise comparisons, the Probability Mass Function is drawn
for every HD, as illustrated in Fig. 7. The x-axis represents
the Inter-Chip variation expressed in Hamming Distance of
PUF IDs between two FPGAs, and the y-axis represents the
probability of each HD. This distribution should be equivalent
to a binomial distribution. We obtain the average HD of 7.51,
which is very close to the ideal average of 7.5 (= M/2).
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
M
as
s 
Fu
nc
tio
n
Inter-Chip Variations
PMF
Figure 7. Inter-Chip variation on 24 LPUFs with N = 2, M = 15.
According to the process dispersion the frequency difference
F j variables follow a normal distribution.
F j ∼ N (0, σ2) ,
where σ2 is the variance due to the process dispersion. Fig. 8
represents the distribution of the F j for the 24 boards and
M×24 = 360 values of F j . We notice a shape very close to a
Gaussian distribution. The standard deviation is σ = 60.8 kHz
obtained with a measurement window of 250 µs at 20◦C and
at the nominal power supply.
C. Performance indicators
The goal of this setup is to assess the quality of the LPUF
according to formal indicators as:
• Randomness: expresses the distribution of ID is balanced
(as many ‘1’ as ‘0’).
• Uniqueness: quantifies how two LPUFs in the same
device (intra) or different devices (inter) return different
results.
• Steadiness: measures the reliability against the noise and
environmental conditions.
The metrics presented by Hori et al. [16] are based on sta-
tistical processing of the logical IDs. Other metrics presented
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 50
-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
M
as
s 
Fu
nc
tio
n
PMF
pdf(Fj)=Ν(0,σ2)
Figure 8. Distribution of F j .
in [17] gives an estimate of the PUF with statistical evaluation
of delay elements. Evaluation has been performed with this
method as it provides accurate probabilities for each indicator.
Moreover it is faster because it does not need to run many
challenges, it relies only on delay measurements.
1) Metrics for the LPUF: In this section, we study the
theoretical evaluation of the LPUF.
Randomness:
It depends on the error probability when the Gaussian
distribution D of all delay elements are not perfectly centered
in 0. According to [17] the Arbiter PUF randomness is given
by:
RandomnessAPUF = 1−
∣∣∣∣erf( E(D)σ√2 ·M )
∣∣∣∣ ,
with σ being the standard deviation of the delays, and M the
number of delay elements.
The LPUF randomness is theoretically maximal as the IDs
are built from delay difference. Thus if we consider the
complementary challenges, the ID results are complementary.
For instance, for N = 2 with the challenge words C1, C2 the
ID is:
IDC1,C2 = sign(DC1C2 −DC2C1)
which is complementary to the ID with challenge words
C2, C1:
IDC2,C1 = sign(DC2C1 −DC1C2)
As these two IDs are correlated, it does not make sense to
use both a challenge and its complement. If only one is used
randomly, either the chosen challenge or its complement, the
randomness should remain statistically perfect.
RandomnessLPUF ≈ 100 % .
Uniqueness:
The uniqueness metric is to check if a correlation exists
between PUF from different devices (Inter) or intra device
(Intra). The experience presented in III-B gives some results
about the inter-uniqueness on 24 FPGAs. The indicator here
is based on a probability corresponding to a comparison of
distributions.. The general delay distribution D is compared
with each distribution DLj of delay elements j among the L
different PUFs.
UniquenessAPUF =
1
M
M∑
j=1
(DLj = D).
For the LPUF, the number of comparisons to perform is
M ·N . Then, the metric for the Uniqueness is defined by:
UniquenessLPUF =
1
N ·M
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
(DLi,j = D).
with DLi,j representing the distribution of element j in the
chain j for the L different instances. The details of calculation
for the distribution difference (DLj = D) is explained in [17].
Steadiness: Every delay difference of element i in chain j
of the LPUF, (di,j0 − di,j1 ), is measured T times.
The noise impact on reliability is based on T measurements
of each delay element composing the chains. The noise
standard deviation S is measured and considered common to
all elements. The steadiness formula studied in [17] is:
Steadiness = 1− Pr(error) (4)
= 1− Pr(error|delay < |λ|) · Pr(delay < |λ|).
Where λ represents a threshold delay above which there is
no error.
Compared to the Arbiter PUF, the LPUF ID is obtained
by computing the sum of Hmax differences between delay
elements, as explained in section II-B3. Hence the delay
variance for each LPUF ID is σ′2 = Hmax · σ2. We have
also to compute the variation of delay measurement SL of a
Loop PUF delay element. We consider that all delay elements
have the same variation of measurement.
As the steadiness for the Arbiter PUF calculated in [17] is
given by:
SteadinessAPUF = 1 − 12
√
2pi − 9
8pi
× S
σ
.
By changing the variable σ in σ′ and S by SL, we obtain
the steadiness expression for the LPUF:
SteadinessLPUF = 1 − 12
√
2pi − 9
8pi
√
Hmax
× SL
σ
.
2) Metrics Results: In order to measure the intra-
uniqueness and steadiness, experiments have been carried out
on a design with 8 LPUFs embedded in a CYCLONE II
FPGA. Each LPUF has N = 3 chains with M = 7 elements.
The challenges sent to the PUF are C1, C2, C3 = 0, 0, 2
j , with
j being the index of the element. The LPUF controller takes
this challenge to operate the rotations and give the difference
of delay for each M × N elements. The layout is shown in
Fig. 9 where every chain is placed in a specific row in order
to be balanced, as explained in section III-A.
Figure 9. Layout of 8 LPUFs with N = 3 in CYCLONE II.
Table II
THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF THE INTRA-DEVICE EVALUATION OF
THE LOOP PUF.
Performance indicator Loop PUF
Randomness ≈ 100%
Intra-Uniqueness 95%
Steadiness 98.7%
Table II gives the results for 8 Loop PUFs with M=8 and
N=3. T = 128 tries are performed to study the steadiness.
The Loop PUF is naturally random. Although measurements
have been done with challenges whose H = 1 (refer to Eq. 2)
and notHmax = 2 for N = 3, we had a good uniqueness 95%.
In normal condition, we obtain a good steadiness value. But
to ensure that our PUF is perfect, more hostile environment
with greater range of temperature and voltage is needed.
IV. DISCUSSION ABOUT SPEED, RELIABILITY AND
ROBUSTNESS
A. Speed vs reliability
The experiments have been performed with an average
latency of 250µs per bit per LPUF. This speed can be enough
for many applications but it can also be reduced or increased
according to the reliability requirements. The useful method
to enhance the reliability of the PUF is performed by adding
an error correction code (ECC) which is the base of the secure
sketch and fuzzy extractor function as described in [18]. The
steadiness gives an idea of the ECC strength as it represents
the opposite of the error probability. As the LPUF uses a time
measurement, the reliability can be improved by increasing the
number of tries. Indeed according to the steadiness metrics (the
opposite of the error probability) estimated from S and σ, the
measurement window can be reduced or enlarged. Table III
indicates the time to get reliable bits according to the error
probability with this configuration: N = 3, M = 7, H = 9,
number of bits = 16, CYCLONE II FPGAs. Hence for a
given error probability there is a trade-off between the ECC
complexity and the LPUF latency time. For instance a simple
ECC like the use of a single parity bit can be enough if we
accept longer LPUF responses. In this case all the 16 bits are
reliable with an error probability of 10−4. In this case 20ms is
used as measurement time. In FPGAs the parity bit can merely
be part of the bitstream and in ASICs like RFID tags it could
be a specific pin state.
Table III
AVERAGE NUMBER OF RELIABLE BITS AMONGST 16, ACCORDING TO THE
ERROR PROBABILITY AND LATENCY TIME, WITH A SINGLE PARITY CHECK
.
LPUF latency time
5ms 10ms 15ms 20 ms
P(error)= 10−4 12 14 15 16
P(error)= 10−7 10 12 14 15
B. Discussion about Robustness against attacks
The modeling attacks are described in details by Ru¨hrmair
et al. [4]. They are based on a model derived from Challenge
Response Pairs collected by eavesdropping and represents one
of the Achille’s heel of Silicon PUF. One solution to thwart
them could be to use cryptographic function. They can be
placed either in the challenge path or the response path.
Therefore it becomes difficult to build a model by a machine
learning technique. For instance every word of the challenge
word can be transformed by a Non-Linear (NL) function like a
substitution Box (SBox). As the LPUF intrinsic key is secret,
or known only by the authorized LPUF user, it can be added
to the challenge word before entering the SBox, similarly to
the AES datapath. However this extra logic should not be too
complex to harm the low-cost interest of the PUF compared
to signature in ROM or anti-fuse.
Another type of attack is the Side Channel attacks where
the adversary observes the PUF activity via the current or the
electromagnetic field. Hence the oscillation can be counted and
the PUF ID can be deduced. This attack could be thwarted
by using a random number generator (RNG) which selects
the order with which the time measurement is done by the
controller. As the LPUF controllers generates itself the RNG,
it knows what is the real challenge. This protection could also
be efficient against fault attack as the adversary does not know
the real challenge. Moreover the perturbation noise affects all
the delay chains in the same manner and it should not affect
the result. Fig. 10illustrates a possible countermeasure for both
the modeling and side-channel attack.
V. CONCLUSION
The Loop PUF based on N controlled identical delay chain
has been introduced. It has been shown that this structure is
easy to design and offers a huge number of challenges as
it is based on sequential comparisons on N delay chains.
SBox
SBox
SBox
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7
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Controller
challenge
keys
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to LPUF
barrelshifter
key2
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key0
Figure 10. Countermeasure based on preprocessing of the challenge.
Consequently this permits low-cost methods for authentication
and key extraction. The LPUF has been evaluated by means
of experiments carried out on 24 FPGA boards and 8 LPUFs
in the same FPGA. The results show that the level of speed
and performance can fit in low complexity devices where a
latency of a few ms is acceptable. The randomness of LPUF
is perfect and the level of uniqueness and steadiness is also
very high.
Future works include the study of robustness against mod-
eling and physical attacks. Temperature and voltage tests will
also be carried out to refine the reliability parameters, and
check if stronger ECC are necessary.
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